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This study examines the fiscal impact the  Ballpark in Arlington has on the City
of Arlington.  Many individuals argue that the new Ballpark in Arlington would create
numerous new jobs and bring added economic development to the city, thus increasing
sales tax revenues.
An interrupted time-series approach was used to determine whether or not the
new ballpark has a measurable impact on retail sales tax receipts in the City of Arlington.
Based on sales tax rebate data obtained from the Texas Comptroller’s Office, the study
found no significant increase in sales tax receipts for Arlington during the baseball
season.    However, this is not to say that the Ballpark in Arlington has no impact on total
local economic activity.  These findings do call into question, as other studies have, the
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The Public Funding Of Sports Stadiums 
 
 Cities across the United States are facing the pressure to upgrade or construct new 
sports facilities in order to maintain their status as upper tier communities.  These new 
facilities, which cost well upwards of 200 million dollars, are being financed by all levels 
of government.  The subsidy begins with the federal government granting state and local 
governments the opportunity to issue tax exempt bonds to help finance the stadiums.  On 
the state level, subsidies are handed out as relief for corporate taxes and abatements.  
Finally, the local subsidy can take the from of a dedicated sales tax for the new project 
and can also entail other giveaways that include streets and utilities.  This study will 
explore the overall economic impact of the Ballpark in Arlington by studying the 
increase of sales tax revenue generated from the voter approved half cent sales tax 
increase. 
 One of the main rationales to subsidize sports facilities is revealed in a time 
honored slogan ,Build the Stadium--create the Jobs (Noll 1)!  In addition, in order to win 
voter approval of the tax increases, politictions and team owners promise that new 
businesses will arrive and that existing busnesses will expand.  Many citizens ask the 
question, why contribute millions to the wealthy, when they can finance the project 
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themselves?  The response often given is that the public will benefit greatly in job 
creation and economic development.  
 
Why Cities Subsidize Sports 
 Proponents of publicly financed stadiums argue that sports facilities improve the 
local economy in four ways.  First, building the facility creates many local construction 
jobs.  Second, people who attend games or work for the team generate new spending in 
the community.  Third, a team attracts tourists and companies to the host city.  Finally, all 
this new spending has a multiplier effect as increased local income causes still more new 
spending and job creation.  Team owners and local politicians argue that new stadiums 
spur so much economic growth that they are self-financing due to ticket taxes, sales taxes 
on concessions, other visitor spending from outside the stadium, and property tax 
increases arising from ancillary development.  Unfortunately, these arguments contain 
poor economic reasoning leading to an overstatement of the benefits of stadiums and 
ultimately misleading the public.  True economic growth occurs when a community’s 
resources--people, capital, and natural resources-- become more productive.  Increased 
productivity can arise in two ways; from economically beneficial specialization by the 
community for the purpose of trading with other regions or from local value added that is 
higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments(Noll 30).  Building a mega 
dollar stadium is good for the local economy only if a stadium is the most productive way 
to make capital investments and use its workers.  Yet, cities tend to ignore the economic 
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aspects of stadium financing and rely more on the social and psychological signifigance 
of sports (Noll 25). 
 A sports stadium can spur economic growth if sports is a significant export 
industry--that is, if it attracts outsiders to buy the local product and if it results in the sale 
of certain rights (broadcasting, product licensing) to national firms (Noll 18).  In addition, 
if a stadium is located within the confines of an urban center, then this new venue can be 
a keystone component.  This urban revitalization will likely not occur if the sports team is 
unwilling to share in the financing of new construction. 
 Cities also assist in the financing of stadiums out of fear of losing existing teams. 
Team owners will force a city into building a new stadium or arena by threatening to 
leave and go to an area that is willing to pay the subsidy.  Some cites refuse to knuckle 
under such pressure, such as Houston when the Houston Oliers wanted a bigger stadium.  
Houston Mayor, Bob Lanier, in testimony before Congress in 1995 spoke of the problems 
confronted by a city dealing with a sports team that demands a new stadium from a city: 
The real demand is for luxury boxes, not more seats.  So the average 
working person is asked to put a tax on their home or pay sales or some 
other consumer tax to build luxury boxes in which they cannot afford to 
sit.  Frequently, the new stadium is smaller.  The working person is asked 
to be satisfied with the sense of pride they get from the arrangement, 
which will last until another team bids more for their players, or until 
another city bids for the team.  In Houston, we have chosen the priorities 
of our youth program, but we do not think we should have been forced to 




Unlike Houston, most cities fail to take sound economic advice and fall victim to 
economic blackmail from professional team sports.  Their rationale is that if the subsidies 
are not granted then the teams will leave for other cities. 
 When the economic arguments fail to win voters over, many team owners, 
community leaders and politicians make an impassioned pleas for sports.  Such pleas for 
the approval of a new stadium almost always focuses on the culture of sports and how 
sports are important to the human condition.  James Michener,  makes such an 
impassioned plea: 
[A] city needs a big public stadium because that’s on e of the things that 
distinguishes a city.  I would not elect to live in a city that did not have a 
spacious public building in which to play games, and as a tax payer I 
would  be willing to have the city use my dollars to help build such a 
stadium, it were necessary.  I am therefore unequivocally in support of 
public stadiums. . . . I believe  that each era of civilization generates its 
peculiar architectural symbol, and that this acquires a spiritual significance 
far beyond its mere utilitarian purpose (338). 
 
For Michener, a large stadiums represents a distinguishing achievement which 
will enhance a cities cultural and spiritual reputation for many years to come (Rosentraub 
1996, 30). 
 Certainly, sports and their arenas are important to American culture.  For 
example, the city of Dallas used the world wide success of the Dallas Cowboys durng the 
late 1960s and early 1970s to move forward in the wake of the Kennedy assasination.  
Before the success of the Cowboys and certainly after the assasination, Dallas was known 
as a city of hate.  One can argue that the City of Dallas might have recovered without the 
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Dallas Cowboys being America’s Team;  however, it  is widely believed in most circles, 
that the Dallas area recovered a lot quicker with the  huge success of the Cowboys.   
 Another argument that is used to promote the public financing of sports stadia is 
that professional sports teams help improve local quality of life.  A closer look at why 
companies move would reveal that education, transportation, infrastructure, tax policies, 
and access to markets are the main reasons for a relocation.  For example, the cities of 
Plano and Richardson have been successful in recent years in attracting corporations 
despite the fact that neither has a professional team. 
 A final reason that cities have a willingness to finance new stadiums is the 
promise of more jobs.  The Federal Employment Act of 1946, which articulated the 
government’s intent to provide employment for all able and willing workers, started the 
American concept of full employment (Baade, 1997, 98).  This philosophy has permeated 
the American thought to a point that few question a rationale for public expenditures 
based on a projects job creation potential (Baade, 1997, 98).  Baade also makes the 
argument that replacing an existing stadium only relocates the work place, leaving the 
work force all but unchanged except for a few high level management jobs (1997, 98).   
The City of Arlington 
 The city of Arlington, Texas, lies between Dallas and Ft. Worth and is a few 
miles south of DFW Airport.  With a population of over 300,000 citizens, Arlington is 
the thrid largest city in the DFW Metroplex.  For several decades, the city has tried to 
base its economic development on sports and recreation (Rosentruab 45).  Such 
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entertainment magnets as Six Flags Over Texas and the water park, Hurricane Harbor, 
provides Arlington several avenues to attract visitors.   
 Yet, Arlington’s economy is as diverse as it is grounded in entertainment.  The 
General Motors plant in the city has provided thousands of jobs for several decades.  In 
addition, The University of Texas  at Arlington is one of the largest second tier schools in 
Texas.  These large and diverse economic strong points gives the city a unique position in 
the search for growth and development. 
The History of The Texas Rangers 
 In 1972,  Arlington mayor, Tom Vandergriff, persuaded the Washington Senators 
baseball team to leave Washington D.C. for Texas.  The new Texas Rangers would begin 
play in 1973 and play in the old Turnpike Stadium, an old minor league stadium.  The 
minor league stadium was upgraded in the late 1970s and its name changed to Arlington 
Stadium.  The team struggled financially every year and several owners attempted to be 
competitive with one of the lowest payrolls in the major leagues.   
 In the 1980s, free agency began to escalate player’s salaries and baseball owners 
struggled to meet the demand for the elite athletes.  The new stadiums built in the 
late1970s and 1980s began to have luxury and corporate suites installed.  These suites or 
boxes were controlled exclusively by the team owners and their representatives and 
subject sharing arrangements with other teams.  The teams fortunate enough to have 
these boxes were able to increase their payrolls, and in theory, have  better teams.  
Arlington Stadium, however, did not have a single luxury box in its upgraded condition.  
Furthermore, at least a third of the seats in Arlington Stadium were in the outfield and 
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were inexpensive to the consumer.  This unfavorable revenue flow caused the Ranger 
baseball team to fall further behind the elite teams of the east and west coasts.   
 During the late 1980s a financial group headed up by Rusty Rose  and George W. 
Bush, purchased the Texas Rangers from oil man Eddie Chiles for $86 million .  George 
Bush paid $650,00.00 for a 1.8 percentage share of the team and was named managing 
partner.  With George Bush as a figure head owner and the cash of Rusty Rose, the 
Rangers started to plan for a bigger ballpark that would provide the correct number of 
luxury suites and higher end seats. 
 The new ownership of the Texas Rangers went to the voters in Arlington in 1991 
with a plan to build a new ballpark next to Arlington Stadium.  The voters were asked to 
approve a 1/2 cent increase in the local sales tax rate that would provide a total of $135 
million  to the total cost of $195 million cost of construction.  Voters approved the new 
sales tax and construction commenced with completion scheduled in time for the 1994 
season.  In January of 1998, Tom Hicks, the owner of the Dallas Stars, purchased the 
Rangers for an estimated $250 million , with this increase in team value largely attributed 







 A large portion of the research findings for the last two decades concerning public 
subsidies for sports arenas is negative.  The proponents of subsidies for sports venues, 
including politicians and team owners, claim that the subsidies are needed to promote the 
welfare of the area and keep existing teams in place.  These supporters claim that the 
subsidies will in the long run provide more jobs and economic diversity.  On the other 
hand, opponents of team subsidies believe that such hand outs to the  team owners are 
poor economic planning and corporate welfare.  
 Mark Rosentraub, is the leader of the opposition towards the public financing of 
sports stadiums and arenas.  In his book Major League Losers, Rosentraub claims that 
subsidies to team owners are little more than hand outs to the rich (4).  He further claims 
that an organized system of welfare to the rich is taking place across this country when 
new stadiums and arenas are built (3).  Rosentraub believes that this welfare system 
exists because local and state political leaders are “blinded by the promises of economic 
growth, mesmerized by visions of enhanced images of their  communities , and 
captivated by a mythology of the importance of sports” (3). 
 Robert Baade, has published extensively on the subject of financial incentives for 
stadiums.  Like Rosentraub, Baade claims that most stadiums deals do not benefit a 
community enough to take the financial risk of raising taxes.  Baade’s main argument is 
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that the jobs promised by stadiums proponents are not capable of supporting families and 
are seasonal in nature (Noll 99).  Baade also claims that the new stadiums attract a large 
amount of revenue from outside the stadium’s neighborhood, but a huge amount of this 
revenue goes into the pockets of the owners and players ( Badde 1996, 3).  With the 
advent of the contemporary stadium, Baade explains that a new project might detract 
from an urban economic development plan rather than add to it.  Since the new style of 
ballpark attempts to obtain every last source of revenue, from culinary options and 
souvenirs to child care, the neighborhood busnesses are left behind (Baade, 1996, 3).   
 Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, in their book Sports, Jobs, and Taxes, go into 
great detail in covering the opportunity costs of financing a stadium with public funds. 
They argue that: 
 Because of the significance opportunity costs, a public investment should 
be evaluated in terms of the best alternative way to use the same 
resources.  The presence of unemployment may be a legitimate rationale 
for a public investment program, but it is not a rationale for building a 
stadium, rather than making some other public investment.  In order for 
the stadium to be the best choice, it must generate net benefits that exceed 
alternative uses.  The opportunity forgone in building a stadium is not the 
cost of the stadium, but the benefits from the other ways this money could 
be spent 62). 
 
In addition, Noll and Zimbalist question the validity of the multiplier effect in 
relationship to professional sports.  They contend that a professional team’s contribution 
to the total economy is small and is hard to quantify without looking at the team’s 
internal accounting figures (Noll 73). 
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 In his book, Playing The Field, Charles Euchner takes to task the large economic 
multiplier effect that many proponents of incentives claim occur when new stadiums are 
built.  Euchner believes that such multipliers are inflated and add little to the projection 
of a cities economic development (70-71).  Like Michener, Euchner believes that cities 
are symbols and are important because symbols help people find there way through a 
confusing world (168).  Euchner claims that a notable symbol of a city is a professional 
sports team, because it enhances civic pride” (168).  Even Mark Rosentraub believes that 
sports is too important a part of western society for us to think that cities can exist 
without teams and the events which define essential dimensions of our society and life 
(Rosentraub, 1996, 29). 
 Unlike most economists, Thomas Chema believes that economic incentives work 
in professional sports stadiums.  Chema takes issue with the concept that most of the jobs 
created in a new stadium are low wage and seasonal.  He makes the argument that a 
strong economic plan calls for a variety of skills and wage levels ( Chema 21).  In 
accordance with most economists, Chema also believes that a new sports stadium should 






THE CASE FOR SUBSIDIES 
 There is strong support in this country to provide economic incentives for 
organizations to stay in place and move into a community.  Obviously most politicians 
and team owners are in full and enthusiastic support of  incentives that will improve their 
bottom lines.  These incentives range from tax relief and abatements to vast infrastructure 
improvements; such as new access roads, water, and sewage treatment for  little or no 
cost.  The main argument for such incentives rests upon the theory that if the incentives 
are not given, then the organization will seek a location that can offer a better economic 
deal.  Corporations, like sports teams,  realize the pressure that can be placed upon a local 
community to offer incentives to stay and many take full advantage of the situation.  
 A further reason to offer incentives for a new stadium is the promise of more jobs 
for the local community.  The former mayor of Arlington, Richard Greene, was quoted in 
The Ft. Worth Star Telegram on June, 25 1990, expounding the creation of new jobs the 
new Ballpark in Arlington will create hundreds and maybe thousands of new jobs within 
the city of Arlington and surrounding area.  The type  of  promised new jobs were lost in 
the rhetoric of details of trying to win the sales tax referendum.  Greene further promised 
that the new Ballpark would bring in new businesses that would be centered in and 
around the surrounding area of the stadium.  These new businesses would provide the 
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City of Arlington with a much larger tax base, and in return, the city would be able to 
benefit from the early retirement of the debt for the new ballpark. 
 In a response to Robert Baade’s attack on economic incentives, Thomas Chema 
believes that the cities of the future will need to create a critical mass of opportunities for 
those individuals living in a large metropolitan area ( 19).  Chema points out that cities 
such as Cleveland, Baltimore, Indianapolis, and Minneapolis have been successful in 
integrating an urban climate for strategic growth ( 20).  In addition, Chema points out 
that a sports venue should be placed in an urban setting to obtain the full economic 
development benefits ( 20).  He states that spin-off development or collateral 
development will occur if a ballpark or arena is located so that thousands of people will 
have the opportunity to enter the entertainment area in a concentrated time frame 20).    
Chema also disagrees that a community should not offer incentives to a team because the 
teams and players will disburse their economic profits away from the local economy.  He 
asserts that such companies as auto plants and steel mills will disburse profits away from 
the local economy also (21).  Finally, Chema argues that the low wage and skilled jobs 
offered by a new arena are needed within the urban community to provide a diverse 
mixture of job types (21). 
 Another supporter of government subsidies for stadia, Darius Irani, explains that a 
stadium can be successful if the consumer surplus is greater than the variable costs of the 
project.  Irani defines consumer surplus as the difference between what the sports fan 
would be willing to pay for a sporting event versus what the fan actually pay (Irani 241).  
Irani does not fully explain how such a consumer surplus benefits a city that has provided 
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a lot of tax dollars for the team owners to build a new stadium.  However, Irani does 
admit that the methods of financing a new stadium raises important equity issues. 
Because new stadiums are financed by sales taxes and sin taxes low income individuals 
will pay a disproportional share of the subsidies (251). 
 Richard Alm, a sports economist columnist for the Dallas Morning News,   
claims in a January 16, 1999 article that the Ballpark in Arlington is a huge financial 
success for the team and city.  Alm states that the Texas Rangers produced $121.4 
million  in economic activity for Arlington.  In addition, Alm claims that the bonds taken 
out to pay for the new stadium will be paid off much earlier than expected.  The $121,4 
million notwithstanding, Alm admits that the big winners in the Ballpark in Arlington are 
the team owners.  Ac cording to information from the Texas Rangers Rangers the value 
of  the team went from $88 million when Rose and Bush bought the team, to $250 







THE CASE AGAINST INCENTIVES.  
 In his book, Major League Losers, Mark Rosentraub believes that sports are an 
integral part of US and Canadian societies by “providing entertainment, opportunities for 
countless discussions and debates, an escape from the demands of daily life, and possible 
economic gains” (448).  Rosentraub also recognizes that professional sports teams 
promote community spirit and help establish an identify for many regions and people 
(448).  However, Roesntraub warns that governmental enntities should be very carefull 
when considering subsidies for  professional teams (449). 
 One of the major issues that Rosentraub has with giving subsidies to professional 
sports teams is that taxes are used to improve the  welfare of the rich.  He reasons that 
while Arlington has had success in paying off the debt of financing the new ballpark, the 
sales taxes provided by the lower-income people produce the profits distributed to the 
wealthy owners and players (447).  Although the increase of a half cent to the sales tax is 
small, Rosentraub explains that it is still “welfare in a state that abhors life on the dole;  it 
is a subsidy in a state that defends capitalism and the spirit of the free market 
system”(447).  Rosentraub asks whether it is time for communities to see if “other 
investments (schools, public safety, family recreation, and so on) could make a city major 
league and produce the same level of tangible benefits that the intangible benefit of teams 
seem to be” (447). 
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 Rosentraub believes that the only way a subsidized stadium will have a small 
chance to work is that it must be built in an urban area (1994 236).  A good example of  
how  a city can be almost successful is Indianapolis.  Even when a stadium is built within 
a downtown area, Rosentraub argues that it is still a bad choice for the taxpayer (1994, 
236). According to Rosentraub, a city should develop an economic development program 
focuses on a communities natural economic advantage inherent to the area (1994, 238). 
 Any analysis of the impact of a stadium or professional sports team should 
consider the opportunities a city loses by using subsidies.  The question should not be 
whether a new ballpark has a net impact on economic development, but rather if it has the 
largest impact on the area from a set of alternative development projects (Baade, 1996, 
6).  The impact should be measured for its long term ramifications, rather than short term 
entertainment values and emotional ties.  Baade states that an economic development 
strategy which concentrates on these types of jobs could lead to a situation where the city 
gains a comparative advantage in unskilled and seasonal labor (1996 7).  For the city of 
Arlington’s case, one could argue that the city has enough jobs that are seasonal and low 







 The success or failure of an economic development plan for a community can 
only be measured over an extended length of time.  A plan that is not allowed to provide 
a long range picture is of little use to a community.  There are many evaluation methods 
to measure the success of an economic development plan;  including, real estate values, 
job creation, income, and sales tax increases.  The sales tax is a good tool to measure the 
economic growth and activity in a community.  Furthermore, the sales tax information is 
readily understood and easy to obtain..   
 An interrupted time-series model was used to determine whether or not the 
Ballpark in Arlington had an effect on the retail sales tax in the city of Arlington.  The 
first model presented were multiple observations with one interruption is shown below: 
 
01  O2  03  04  05   X   06  07  08  09  010 
X = interruption: the new ballpark  
O = quarterly sales tax information 
 A second times-series was performed using the 2nd and 3rd quarters as  





O1  O2  X  X  03  04  X  05  06  X  X 
X = interruption, the new ballpark 
O = quarterly sales tax information 
 The Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA, or Box-Jenkins ) 
models was used on the Arlington Retail sales Tax time-series.  The Box-Jenkins model 
is designed to permit unbiased estimates of the error in a series (Cook and Campbell  
235).  In addition, the Box-Jenkins model is designed to make a time-series stationary.  
According to Cook and Campbell, most time-series have secular trends and thus are 
nonstationary.  A nonstationary time-series must be made stationary by differencing the 
series.   
 Cook and Campbell explain that there are several threats to internal validity in a 
time-series experiment.  First, there is a possibility of a maturation effect or an upward 
rise before the intervention.  They claim that a time-series experiment can asses the 
maturation effect prior to the intervention where other experiments cannot (Cook and 
Campbell 209). Second,  a cyclical trend can masquerade as a treatment effect.  A time-
series can delete the cyclical trend by assessing the pre-intervention data and allowing the 
possibility of a regression alternative explanation of the findings (Cook and Campbell 
211).  The cyclical patterns in a time-series experiment must be displayed where the 
cyclical variation had been removed and the series is expressed as deviation from an 
expected cyclical pattern (Cook and Campbell 213).  A final threat to internal validity, 
and the most common form, is the main effect of history-the possibility of forces other 
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than the treatment under investigation came to influence the dependent variable 
immediately prior to or after this modeled intrusion (Cook 211). 
 The archival data collected for this experiment were in quarterly intervals instead 
of monthly or weekly intervals.  Due to the dynamic nature of collecting taxes, the 
quarterly totals changed weekly in the most recent months.  While the small incremental 
changes in the data did not invalidate the experiment, finding the most accurate count 
became problematic.  This issue was addressed by constantly changing the data set when 







 The NCSS 2000 statistical program was used to obtain a time-series analysis of  
the sales tax information gathered from the Texas Comptrollers office.  The model  
formulated for the experiment is: 
Model-------------------Regular (0,1,0)   Seasonal (2,1,0)   
Trend Equation---------(2.245024E+08) + (7307719) X(date) 
 In the ARIMA Report, (Appendix A) the model estimation section shows that the 
parameter estimates are within the bounds set out by Cook and Campbell (251).  In 
addition, the t values show to be significant for this particular model.  The autocorrelation 
chart of the residuals show that the model is stationary.  Finally, the Portmanteau test 
value describes an adequate model.   
 A regression model was issued using the using the residuals from the ARIMA 
model as  the independent variable and the intrusion of the first year of the new Ballpark 
in Arlington as the dependent variable.  The null hypothesis for this experiment is that the 
construction of the new Ballpark in Arlington did not have an effect on the overall sales 
tax collections.  The Multiple Regression Report (Annex B), does not indicate that the 
ballpark in Arlington had a significant effect on the sales tax collection at the 95% 
confidence level.  A second regression equation was obtained using the 2nd and 3rd 
quarters as the interruption.  Again, the regression reports demonstrates that the new 
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Ballpark in Arlington did not have a significant impact on the sales tax, even in the 
months that the Texas Rangers were playing.   
A comparison between the increase of sales tax between the cities of Arlington and Plano 
was also developed.  The comparison was made between the 1st and 2nd quarters and 
2nd and 3rd quarters.  
            1st to 2nd     2nd to3rd Overall 
 Arlington  9.1%        7.7%    64% 
 Plano   13.6%            2.2%    19% 
 
 From January 1986 to December of 1999 the city of Arlington  had a 64 percent 
increase in retail sales tax collections, while the city of Plano had only a 19 percent 
increase.  The city of Plano had a weak increase from the 2nd to 3rd and Arlington had a 
slight drop from the 2nd to 3rd.  An argument could be made that the Ballpark in 







 The time-series data does not indicate that the introduction of the new stadium in 
Arlington, Texas has had significant effect on the retail sales tax revenues.  These 
findings do not, however, prove that the Ballpark in Arlington has no impact on the city.  
In fact, the final comparison numbers indicate that the economy of Arlington has grown a 
great deal and the Ballpark in Arlington, as well as the other entertainment attractions, 
contribute to the economic well being of the city.  The city of Arlington certainly could 
have used the half cent increase in the sale tax for other more justifiable economic 
development plans.  For example, the city could have instituted a job training program in 
the high-tech field and provided more jobs at a lower cost.  The city might have forced 
the Texas Rangers to move to another location by refusing to finance the new ballpark, 
but the city would have lost a lot of intangible benefits from having a major league 
baseball team.   
 Without the Texas Rangers, the City of Arlington’s economy might not have 
grown at such a high rate.  Arlington, with its vast concentrations of tourism and heavy 
manufacturing, could survive without professional baseball.  Certainly the Rangers could 
have stayed in the old Arlington Stadium, but the escalation of players salaries forced the 
team into reconfiguring their income.  A refurbished Arlington stadium, with the addition 
of luxury boxes,  would have cost the taxes payers a lot less and solved their income 
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problems.  While the sales tax did not have a significant rise due to the construction of 
the new Ballpark in Arlington, the value of the team did increase and the new owner of 




















 ARIMA Report 
 




Minimization Phase Section 
Itn Error Sum  
No. of Squares Lambda SAR(1) SAR(2) 
0 1.441263E+16 0.01 0.1 0.1 
1 1.040699E+16 0.01 -0.3972545 -0.2911453 
Normal convergence. 
 
Model Description Section 
Series Arlington_Retail_2-TREND 
Model Regular(0,1,0)    Seasonal(2,1,0) Seasons = 4 




Pseudo R-Squared 98.808883 
Residual Sum of Squares 1.040699E+16 
Mean Square Error 2.123876E+14 
Root Mean Square 1.457352E+07 
 
Model Estimation Section 
Parameter Parameter Standard Prob 
Name Estimate Error T-Value Level 
SAR(1) -0.3972545 0.1367723 -2.9045 0.003678 
SAR(2) -0.2911453 0.1328671 -2.1913 0.028434 
 
 
Asymptotic Correlation Matrix of Parameters 
 
 SAR(1) SAR(2) 
SAR(1) 1.000000 0.000000 





 ARIMA Report 




Forecast Section of Arlington_Retail_2 
Row Date Actual  Residual  Forecast  Lower 95%   Limit Upper 95%  
1 1987 1 244253205.00 -5743653.56 249996858.56 209601854.61 290391862.51 
2 1987 2 268740480.00 -4732010.09 273472490.09 233077486.14 313867494.04 
3 1987 3 264721889.00 -2611062.57 267332951.57 226937947.62 307727955.52 
4 1987 4 298618234.00 -4297568.76 302915802.76 262520798.81 343310806.71 
5 1988 1 231528591.00 886861.68 230641729.32 190246725.37 271036733.27 
6 1988 2 266602802.00 8335112.15 258267689.85 217872685.90 298662693.80 
7 1988 3 272265785.00 8223907.10 264041877.90 223646873.95 304436881.84 
8 1988 4 303228009.00 -4276104.32 307504113.32 267109109.37 347899117.27 
9 1989 1 255425859.00 18517710.29 236908148.71 196513144.76 277303152.65 
10 1989 2 292574918.00 4880208.10 287694709.90 247299705.95 328089713.85 
11 1989 3 292797557.00 -2252900.43 295050457.43 254655453.48 335445461.38 
12 1989 4 347165472.00 20595458.39 326570013.61 286175009.66 366965017.56 
13 1990 1 262494121.00 -28312686.89 290806807.89 250411803.94 331201811.84 
14 1990 2 306191207.00 10454606.00 295736601.00 255341597.05 336131604.95 
15 1990 3 311395091.00 5638788.51 305756302.49 265361298.54 346151306.44 
16 1990 4 363288354.00 5969107.97 357319246.03 316924242.08 397714249.98 
17 1991 1 291452507.00 3804511.40 287647995.60 247252991.65 328042999.55 
18 1991 2 336295297.00 4351019.19 331944277.81 291549273.86 372339281.76 
19 1991 3 346028612.00 4924322.42 341104289.58 300709285.63 381499293.53 
20 1991 4 396777824.00 4687338.69 392090485.31 351695481.37 432485489.26 
21 1992 1 315972761.00 -14604548.17 330577309.17 290182305.22 370972313.12 
22 1992 2 364205473.00 5751485.14 358453987.86 318058983.91 398848991.81 
23 1992 3 367036903.00 -3652282.35 370689185.35 330294181.40 411084189.30 
24 1992 4 428944085.00 9983007.40 418961077.60 378566073.66 459356081.55 
25 1993 1 352469024.00 4503937.13 347965086.87 307570082.92 388360090.82 
26 1993 2 409441512.00 10420003.98 399021508.02 358626504.07 439416511.97 
27 1993 3 420315724.00 6619699.73 413696024.27 373301020.32 454091028.21 
28 1993 4 499005242.00 20881804.44 478123437.56 437728433.61 518518441.50 
29 1994 1 393734526.00 -29686887.17 423421413.17 383026409.22 463816417.12 
30 1994 2 442396056.00 -3852083.14 446248139.14 405853135.19 486643143.09 
31 1994 3 456900570.00 4815881.94 452084688.06 411689684.11 492479692.01 
32 1994 4 548456575.00 22781935.23 525674639.77 485279635.82 566069643.71 
33 1995 1 439407041.00 -13957361.12 453364402.12 412969398.17 493759406.07 
34 1995 2 502006948.00 13181356.22 488825591.78 448430587.83 529220595.73 
35 1995 3 514462781.00 1735090.65 512727690.35 472332686.40 553122694.30 
36 1995 4 582211606.00 -13809812.73 596021418.73 555626414.78 636416422.68 
37 1996 1 501855325.00 18808381.86 483046943.14 442651939.19 523441947.09 
38 1996 2 538980241.00 -22357604.52 561337845.52 520942841.57 601732849.47 
39 1996 3 516944519.00 -34248457.43 551192976.43 510797972.48 591587980.38 
40 1996 4 583602909.00 -6801926.88 590404835.88 550009831.93 630799839.83 
41 1997 1 478055316.00 -14892973.92 492948289.92 452553285.97 533343293.86 
42 1997 2 545885010.00 24642816.45 521242193.55 480847189.60 561637197.50 
43 1997 3 545807716.00 7660039.74 538147676.26 497752672.31 578542680.21 
44 1997 4 620310561.00 479926.94 619830634.06 579435630.11 660225638.01 
45 1998 1 485902407.00 -30514017.42 516416424.42 476021420.47 556811428.37 
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46 1998 2 568778744.00 19827330.21 548951413.79 508556409.84 589346417.74 
47 1998 3 567415672.00 -2604747.42 570020419.42 529625415.47 610415423.37 
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Forecast Section of Arlington_Retail_2 
Row Date  Actual Residual  Forecast  Lower 95%         Upper 95%  
49 1999 1 505912903.00 -10421501.30 516334404.30 475939400.35 556729408.25 
50 1999 2 559688521.00 -14183821.85 573872342.85 533477338.90 614267346.80 
51 1999 3 558901741.00 6458603.42 552443137.58 512048133.63 592838141.53 
52 1999 4 638660979.00 13552822.58 625108156.42 584713152.47 665503160.37 
53 2000 1 534365465.00 16660332.40 517705132.60 477310128.65 558100136.55 
54 2000 2 588663208.00 -6657506.81 595320714.81 554925710.86 635715718.76 
55 2000 3 596832100.00 8810258.39 588021841.61 547626837.66 628416845.56 
56 2000 4 679632656.00 6187912.30 673444743.70 633049739.75 713839747.65 
57 2001 1   564263724.56 523868720.61 604658728.50 
58 2001 2   626826587.80 577353013.88 676300161.71 
59 2001 3   631270014.35 574142851.92 688397176.79 
60 2001 4   708427764.48 635220285.28 781635243.68 
61 2002 1   591129806.69 504786553.73 677473059.66 
62 2002 2   650257299.73 552528186.08 747986413.38 
63 2002 3   653573282.54 545652932.39 761493632.69 
64 2002 4   732087197.18 609001667.61 855172726.75 
65 2003 1   618779526.87 482202467.29 755356586.44 
66 2003 2   676865385.40 528014658.79 825716112.02 
67 2003 3   681713901.93 521527184.55 841900619.31 
68 2003 4   761331950.40 583420354.45 939243546.35 
69 2004 1   647000747.44 452976812.01 841024682.87 
70 2004 2   706500591.73 497603394.37 915397789.10 
71 2004 3   711068552.30 488288861.54 933848243.06 


































Autocorrelations of Residuals of Arlington_Retail_2-TREND 
Lag Correlation Lag Correlation Lag Correlation Lag Correlation 
1 -0.154853 13 -0.299396 25 0.125778 37 0.140120 
2 0.010724 14 -0.074529 26 0.011237 38 -0.042857 
3 -0.098704 15 -0.046347 27 -0.027607 39 -0.027333 
4 -0.062312 16 0.174161 28 0.138569 40 -0.037363 
5 0.020237 17 -0.180307 29 -0.137112 41 0.028477 
6 0.079246 18 0.119228 30 -0.061108 42 -0.031496 
7 -0.156337 19 -0.037747 31 -0.040415 43 0.021024 
8 -0.080405 20 0.070234 32 0.024384 44 0.033704 
9 0.218935 21 -0.053962 33 -0.097047 45 -0.007822 
10 0.208756 22 -0.059935 34 0.030696 46 0.057774 
11 -0.066712 23 -0.051836 35 0.010601 47 0.024843 
12 0.048155 24 -0.134400 36 0.012085 48 0.004777 
Significant if |Correlation|> 0.267261 
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Portmanteau Test Section Arlington_Retail_2-TREND 
  Portmanteau Prob  
Lag DF Test Value Level Decision (0.05) 
3 1 2.02 0.155233 Adequate Model 
4 2 2.26 0.322617 Adequate Model 
5 3 2.29 0.514697 Adequate Model 
6 4 2.70 0.609809 Adequate Model 
7 5 4.32 0.504776 Adequate Model 
8 6 4.75 0.575708 Adequate Model 
9 7 8.07 0.326758 Adequate Model 
10 8 11.14 0.193691 Adequate Model 
11 9 11.46 0.245183 Adequate Model 
12 10 11.64 0.310151 Adequate Model 
13 11 18.41 0.072608 Adequate Model 
14 12 18.84 0.092554 Adequate Model 
15 13 19.01 0.122900 Adequate Model 
16 14 21.47 0.090191 Adequate Model 
17 15 24.18 0.062146 Adequate Model 
18 16 25.39 0.063204 Adequate Model 
19 17 25.52 0.083717 Adequate Model 
20 18 25.96 0.100624 Adequate Model 
21 19 26.23 0.123841 Adequate Model 
22 20 26.58 0.147631 Adequate Model 
23 21 26.84 0.176209 Adequate Model 
24 22 28.67 0.154420 Adequate Model 
25 23 30.33 0.140132 Adequate Model 
26 24 30.34 0.173588 Adequate Model 
27 25 30.43 0.208588 Adequate Model 
28 26 32.66 0.172270 Adequate Model 
29 27 34.92 0.140930 Adequate Model 
30 28 35.39 0.158924 Adequate Model 
31 29 35.60 0.185582 Adequate Model 
32 30 35.68 0.218804 Adequate Model 
33 31 37.01 0.211228 Adequate Model 
34 32 37.15 0.243773 Adequate Model 
35 33 37.16 0.283026 Adequate Model 
36 34 37.19 0.324366 Adequate Model 
37 35 40.54 0.239031 Adequate Model 
38 36 40.88 0.264870 Adequate Model 
39 37 41.02 0.298687 Adequate Model 
40 38 41.30 0.328388 Adequate Model 
41 39 41.48 0.363166 Adequate Model 
42 40 41.71 0.396406 Adequate Model 
43 41 41.82 0.435117 Adequate Model 
44 42 42.13 0.465528 Adequate Model 
45 43 42.14 0.508318 Adequate Model 
46 44 43.23 0.504601 Adequate Model 
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47 45 43.45 0.537712 Adequate Model 



























Multiple Regression Report Ballpark Intrusion 
 
Page/Date/Time 1    06-29-2000 18:45:49 
Database A:\thesis.S0 
Dependent C5 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent Regression Standard T-Value  Prob Decision  Power 
Variable  Coefficient Error  (Ho: B=0) Level (5%)  (5%) 
Intercept 636881.2 2217383 0.2872  0.775       Accept Ho     0.059156 
intrus1 -431813.4  4354854  0.0992               0.921   Accept Ho     0.051086 
R-Squared 0.000189 
Regression Coefficient Section 
  
Variable  Coefficient Error  95% C.L. 95% C.L. Coefficient 
  Coefficient 
Intercept 636881.2 2217383 - 3812624 5086386    0.0000 
intrus1 - 431813.4 4354854 - 9170467 8306841    0.0137 
T-Critical 2.006647 
 
Analysis of Variance Section 
   Sum of  Mean    Prob      Power 
Source  DF Squares  Square  F-Ratio  Level        5% 
Intercept 1 1.487975E+13 1.487975E+13 
Model 1  1.933689E+12 1.933689E+12 0.0098        0.9213950     .051086 
  
Error  52 1.022692E+16 1.966715E+14 
Total(Adjusted) 53 1.022885E+16 1.929972E+14 
 
Root Mean Square Error 1.402396E+07 R-Squared 0.0002 
Mean of Dependent 524929.6 Adj R-Squared 0.0000 
Coefficient of Variation 26.71589 Press Value 1.109519E+16 
Sum |Press Residuals 6.074856E+08 Press R-Squared -0.0847 
 
Normality Tests Section 
Assumption Value  Probability Decision(5%) 
Skewness -1.7791  0.075231 Accepted 
Kurtosis  0.4818  0.629983 Accepted 
Omnibus 3.3971 0 .182948  Accepted 
 
Serial-Correlation Section 
Lag Correlation Lag Correlation Lag Correlation 
1 -0.158563 9 0.199701 17 -0.144929 
2 0.001726 10 0.228649 18 0.114725 
3 -0.122453 11 -0.053163 19 -0.033992 
4 -0.077642 12 0.040515 20 0.082947 
5 0.025646 13 -0.326816 21 -0.060355 
6 0.098647 14 -0.074300 22 -0.060181 
7 -0.151576 15 -0.033031 23 -0.057037 
8 -0.074566 16 0.207207 24 -0.147005 
Above serial Correlations significant if their absolute values are greater than 0.27216 
Durbin-Watson Value  2.3086 
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Independent Variance R-Squared   Diagonal of 
Variable  Inflation  Vs Other X's Tolerance X'X Inverse 
intrus1  1.000000 0.000000 1.000000 9.642857E-02 
 
 
Eigenvalues of Centered Correlations 
 
   Incremental Cumulative Condition 
No. Eigenvalue Percent  Percent  Number 
1 1.000000 100.00  100.00  1.00 
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Multiple Regression Report    2nd and 3rd Quarters Intrusion 
Page/Date/Time 1    06-29-2000 18:43:55 
Database A:\thesis.S0 
Dependent C5 
Regression Equation Section 
Independent Regression Standard T-Value  Prob  Decision  
Variable  Coefficient Error  (Ho: B=0) Level ( 5%   
Intercept -145121.3 2029455 -0. 0715  0.943268  Accept Ho  
C14  5168964 5636730 0.9170  0.363369 Accept Ho  
R-Squared 0.015914 
 
Regression Coefficient Section 
Independent Regression Standard Lower  Upper     Standardized 
 Variable Coefficient Error   95% C.L.             5% C.L.    Coefficient 
      
Intercept -145121.3 2029455 - 4217520 3927278 0.0000 
C14  5168964 5636730 - 6141963 1.647989E07 0.1262 
T-Critical 2.006647 
 
Analysis of Variance Section 
   Sum of  Mean    Prob      Power  
Source  DF Squares  Square  F-Ratio  Level       5%     (5%) 
Intercept 1 1.487975E+13 1.487975E+13 
Model 1 1. 62783E+14 1.62783E+14 0.8409           0.3633690   .146734 
  
Error 52  1.006607E+16 1.935783E+14 
Total(Adjusted) 53 1.022885E+16 1.929972E+14 
 
 
Root Mean Square Error 1.391324E+07 R-Squared 0.0159 
Mean of Dependent 524929.6 Adj R-Squared 0.0000 
Coefficient of Variation 26.50497 Press Value 1.088179E+16 
Sum |Press Residuals 6.084731E+08 Press R-Squared -0.0638 
 
Normality Tests Section 
Assumption Value  Probability Decision(5%) 
Skewness -1.8024  0.071477 Accepted 
Kurtosis  0.2503  0.802393 Accepted 
Omnibus 3.3114  0.190959 Accepted 
 
Serial-Correlation Section 
Lag Correlation Lag Correlation Lag Correlation 
1 -0.156024 9 0.209599 17 -0.144365 
2 0.043584 10 0.222101 18 0.118043 
3 -0.079504 11 -0.045336 19 -0.064978 
4 -0.051312 12 0.057573 20 0.069041 
5 0.038399 13 -0.301598 21 -0.037915 
6 0.126546 14 -0.072140 22 -0.068327 
7 -0.112677 15 -0.036128 23 -0.080682 
8 -0.060871 16 0.207554 24 -0.161540 
Above serial Correlations significant if their absolute values are greater than 0.272166 
Durbin-Watson Value  2.2955 
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Independent Variance R-Squared  Diagonal of 
Variable Inflation Vs Other X's Tolerance X'X Inverse 
C14 1.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.1641337 
 
 
Eigenvalues of Centered Correlations 
 
 Incremental Cumulative Condition 
No.           Eigenvalue      Percent               Percent           Number 








000000.0 500000.0 000000.0 500000.0 000000.










-3.0 -1.5 0.0 1.5 3.0















































Alm, Richard.  Arlington reaping ballparks reward five years after debut.  The Dallas Morning News  
 16 January 1999.  F1. 
Baade, Robert A.  professional Sports As Catalysts For Metropolitan Economic Growth  Journal Of 
 Urban Affairs. 18 (1996):  1-14. 
Baade, Robert A.  stadium Subsidies Make Little Economic Sense For Cities:  A Rejoinder. Journal Of 
 Urban Affairs.  18 (1996):  33-37. 
Chema, Thomas V.  when Professional Sports Justify The Subsidy, a Reply to Robert A. Baade  Journal 
 Of Urban Affairs.  18 (1996):  19-22. 
Cook, Thomas D. and Donald T. Campbell.  Quasi-Experimentation:  Design & Analysis For Field 
 Settings.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1979. 
Euchner, Charles C.  Playing The Field:  Why Sports Teams Move And Cities Fight To Keep Them.  
 Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
Fort, Rodney D. and James Quirk.  Pay Dirt:  The Business Of Professional Sports.  Princeton:  Princeton 
 University Press, 1996. 
Hintze, Jerry.  NCSS: Statistical System For Windows.  Kaysville , Utah:  NCSS, 1996.  
Irani, Daraius.  public Subsidies To Stadiums:  Do The Costs Outweigh The Benefits. Public Finance 
 Review.  25 (1997):238-253. 
Michener, James A.  Sports In America.  New York:  Random House, 1976. 
Noll, Roger G. and Andrew Zimbalist, Ed.  Sports, Jobs, And Taxes:  The Economic Impact Of Sports 
 Teams And Stadiums.  Washington:  Brookings Institute,  1997. 
Rosentraub, Mark S.  Major League Losers:  The real Cost Of Sports And Who’ Paying For It.  New 
 York  Basic Books, 1997. 
Rosentraub Mark S.  Sport And Downtown Development Strategy:  If You Build It, Will Jobs Come?  




Rosentraub, Mark S.  Does The Emperor Have New Clothes?, A Reply To Robert Baade.  Journal Of 
 Urban Affairs.  18  (1996):23-31. 
